Philosophy Overview: The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett

Instructor Information:

Dr. Bruce Umbaugh

office: Pearson House basement

phone: 961-2660 x7826 (office)

968-7170 (PHIL office)

email: bumbaugh@webster2.websteruniv.edu

office hours: Tu 3:00-4:00

Th 11:30-12:00

and by appointment

Course Description:

At four-way stop signs, I hardly ever run into other cars. I think I can tell when my students are interested, bored, or waiting for me to return papers. I can tell when my dog wants to go outside or is ready to be fed dinner. I do not think this is due to any special powers I have: other drivers rarely hit me, my students seem to be sensitive to my various moods, and my dog sticks out his paw when I say, "Shake!" as well. How is it that we understand and anticipate each other in everyday life?

In part to address this question, Daniel Dennett has developed a theory of intentionality over the last thirty years. According to his theory, we adopt a stance and presuppose a particular sort of rationality of the people--or whatever else--we hope to understand. Dennett's work ranges deep and wide, with implications for our thinking about a wealth of philosophical issues. His writing is fun, mostly clear, and provocative.

In the Overview, we will aim to discern what the "intentional stance" is and what is involved in adopting it; to consider some of the objections to Dennett's approach; to trace consequences of this way of engaging some central problems in philosophy; and, ultimately, to evaluate Dennett's theory and central claims. We will read most all of Dennett's 1987 collection, The Intentional Stance, his 1971 article "Intentional Systems," and his 1990 "Real Patterns." In addition, we will read the work of several others inspired by or responding to Dennett's, and two canonical statements that oppose Dennett's position, namely, Nagel's, "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" and Searle's "Minds, Brains, and Programs."

Textbooks

The Intentional Stance, Daniel C. Dennett (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987).

Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind, Bo Dahlbom, ed., (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1993).

Four (I think) other articles will be photocopied and distributed, as will other bits and things as they seem important.

In the expanded course description, I wrote, "Some details of the course will be negotiated with students. Some will be ruthlessly imposed by the instructor." Details ruthlessly imposed include the intended reading schedule below, the requirement that students taking the course to fulfill their overview requirement complete a substantial, professional-style paper, that student papers be discussed in a collegial fashion with those associated with the department during our final examination period, and the expectation that other requirements involve a mix of written and oral work. I anticipate that students not enrolled to complete the overview requirement would write a professional-style review of either of our two chief texts. Some aspects of the schedule are negotiable, I expect. The precise nature and the mix of "other" work are open for discussion the first week of the course. I'll say some more about that--including my thoughts about what other forms of work seem possible--at the first class meeting.

Schedule:

January 16 Introduction.

18 Daniel Dennett, "Preface," "Setting Off on the Right Foot" (Other readings without authors' names affixed are Dennett's, from The Intentional Stance. Some other pieces are listed as being handouts, and the remainder are in the Dahlbom volume.)

23 "Intentional Systems"

25 "True Believers," "Reflections: Real Patterns, Deeper Facts, and Empty Questions"

30 "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology"

February 01 "Reflections: Instrumentalism Reconsidered"

6-8 Stephen P. Stich, "Dennett on Intentional Systems," (handout) Dennett, "Making Sense of Ourselves," "Reflections: When Frogs (and Others) Make Mistakes"

13 "Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast"

15 Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore, "Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative?"

20 "Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended"

22 "Reflections: Interpreting Monkeys, Theorists, and Genes"

27 "Evolution, Error, and Intentionality"

29 John Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," Douglas Hofstadter and Dennett, "Reflections" (all handouts)

March 05 "Fast Thinking"

07 TBA

12 Spring recess.

14 Spring recess.

19 "Real Patterns," (handout) Dahlbom, "Editor's Introduction"

21 John Haugland, "Pattern and Being"

26 Ruth Garrett Millikan, "On Mentalese Orthography"

28 TBA

April 2-4 Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat?" (Handout) Kathleen Akins, "What is it Like to be Boring and Myopic?"

09 Richard Rorty, "Holism, Intrinsicality, and the Ambition of Transcendence"

11 Haugland, "The Intentionality All-Stars" (handout)

16 Papers due.

18 Paper presentations begin.

23-25 More paper presentations.

30 Paper presentations as needed.

May 02 Review. Book reviews due.

May 7, 11:00-1:00 Departmental Colloquium.

Grading:

Grading details will be announced when they are finalized, following discussions and negotiation. Some indication what I mean by "professional-style paper" is attached.

Policy on Academic Honesty:

Students in this class are expected to do their own work and not to rely on the work of others. While students are welcome to work with one another to understand the material, any student plagiarizing, cheating, aiding another student to cheat, or committing any other act of academic dishonesty will be referred for appropriate disciplinary action. Please consult with me if you have any questions in this regard, either about your own work or that of another person.